Current Media Briefings Piper Alpha 20th Anniversary – Media Briefing Background Q: What was Piper Alpha? A: Piper Alpha was a large offshore platform that started production in 1976. It produced oil from 24 wells. In its early life it had also produced gas from two wells. It was connected by an oil pipeline to Flotta to which Claymore and Tartan were also connected, and by gas pipelines to three other nearby installations, Claymore, Tartan and MCP-01. Q: Who operated Piper Alpha? A: The operating company was Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd (“OpCal”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation. After the accident, in July 1991, Elf / Enterprise bought Occidental’s UK assets and acquired control of OpCal. In 1996 Elf / Enterprise demerged and OpCal became a wholly owned Elf Group subsidiary and is now dormant. Elf was subsequently acquired by Totalfina (now Total) in 2000. The Total Group had no involvement with Piper Alpha at the time of the disaster. Q: What happened? A: On 6 July 1988 there was a massive leakage of gas condensate which ignited, causing an explosion that led to large oil fires. The heat ruptured the risers which imported the gas from Claymore and Tartan. This produced further massive explosions and a fireball that engulfed Piper Alpha. All this happened in a relatively short time span. The scale of the disaster was enormous. 167 people died, 61 people survived. Q: What caused the leak? A: It is believed that the leak came from pipework connected to a condensate pump. A safety valve had been removed from this pipework for overhaul and maintenance. Maintenance work on the pump itself was about to commence. It is believed the leak occurred when the pipework from which the safety valve had been removed was pressurized when the pump was re-started. Q: Why did this initial incident escalate into a major disaster? A: The Cullen Report (see below) identified a number of factors which contributed to the escalation of this initial incident. These included deficient analysis of the hazards present and poor plant design; deficiencies in the Permit to Work system employed on the installation; and inadequate training of personnel in the use of Permits to Work and emergency response. Other important issues were continuing oil production from the neighbouring Tartan and Claymore platforms which helped feed the fire and the inability to start the fire pumps on Piper. These had been set to manual operation in order to protect divers beneath the installation. Q: What was the Industry’s immediate response? A: As details of the causes of the disaster emerged, every offshore Operator undertook wide-ranging assessments of their installations and management systems. These included: • Improvements to “Permit to work” management systems • Relocation of some pipeline emergency shutdown valves • Installation of subsea pipeline isolation systems • Mitigation of smoke hazards • Improvements to evacuation and escape systems • Initiation of Formal Safety Assessments The Industry invested in the order of £1bn (which is equivalent to £1.9bn in today’s money) on this and other safety work before Lord Cullen’s Public Inquiry into the disaster reported. Q: What was the Cullen Inquiry? A: Lord Cullen was appointed to chair the official Public Inquiry into the disaster. This was carried out in two parts. The first was to establish the causes of the disaster. The second made recommendations as to the future safety regime for the industry. Lord Cullen commenced the Public Inquiry in November 1988 and his Report was published in November 1990. Q: What part did Industry play? A: The UK Offshore Operators Association (now Oil & Gas UK), the Industry’s Trade Association, was represented throughout but did not participate in part I, which was to establish the cause of the disaster. It played a full role in part II, which considered measures to prevent future major accidents, and provided 34 expert witnesses. Lord Cullen made 106 far-reaching safety recommendations, all of which were accepted by the industry. Many of them came as a direct result of industry evidence. Q: What were the key recommendations of the Cullen Report? A: The principal recommendations were: • The transfer of responsibility for offshore health and safety from the Department of Energy to the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) • The creation of the Safety Case regime • A review of current legislation and replacement by goal setting requirements Responsibility for implementing the 106 recommendations was spread across the HSE, which was to oversee 57; the operator companies which were responsible for 40; the industry as a whole which had to progress eight; and the Standby Ship Owners Association, which had one recommendation to action. Q: What progress was made? A: By 1993 all 48 recommendations for which the industry had been responsible had been acted upon and substantially implemented. At the same time, the HSE developed and implemented the Safety Case regulations, as recommended by Lord Cullen. By 1995, HSE had completed the review of current legislation and (working closely with Industry trade associations and others) provided a goal setting regime. Q: When did the Safety Case Regulations come into force? A: The Safety Case Regulations came into force in 1992. By November 1993 every offshore installation operating in the UK continental shelf had submitted a Safety Case to the HSE and by November 1995 all had had their Safety Case accepted. Q: What does the Safety Case entail? A: Every installation in operation on the UK continental shelf has to submit to the HSE, for their acceptance, a Safety Case which demonstrates that the company has: • A Safety Management System in place that is adequate to ensure compliance with the law; • identified all hazards with the potential to cause a major accident; • evaluated the major accident risks; and • put in place measures to control these risks and ensure compliance with the relevant statutory provisions. The Safety Case must also demonstrate the provision and availability of a temporary refuge, and provisions for safe evacuation and rescue. Q: What is the temporary refuge? A: The temporary refuge is an area which is specially designed to provide a temporary period of protection for the crew in which to muster in safety while an accident is being assessed, and a decision taken on whether or not to abandon the installation. The refuge is equipped, amongst other things, with command, communication, monitoring, mustering and medical facilities. Q: How big a job is it to compile a Safety Case? A: It is very comprehensive. As a guide, each Safety Case costs, on average, about £1 million to prepare. But depending on size and complexity of the installation, costs can be considerably more. There are also costs involved with keeping the safety case up to date to reflect changes that have taken place on the installation. Q: Why did Lord Cullen recommend a “goal setting” safety regime instead of prescriptive regulation? A: A “goal setting” safety regime is one in which the Regulations set the objectives to be achieved without prescribing the detailed measures to be taken. This allows the installation operator to tailor the measures he takes to the actual risks arising on his installation. The Regulatory goals are supported by guidance based on current good industry practices. Q: How are safety guidelines established? A: Lord Cullen recommended that Industry specify the standards used to comply with goal setting regulations. So far, more than 40 sets of Oil & Gas UK Guidelines have been published in accordance with this recommendation. These are usually developed with other stakeholders, such as the HSE and other Trade Associations and have been revised and updated over the past 20 years. Changes to Industry Safety Practice since Piper Alpha Q: What significant changes have been made to safety in the last 20 years? A: Platform Design: There have been significant changes to the way platforms are designed to give added protection to the people living and working on board. These include temporary refuge improvements; emergency shut down valves which automatically stop the flow of fluids within a pipeline; fire protection and blast walls. Goal-Setting Legislation: This was one of the key recommendations of Lord Cullen and includes the Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response (PFEER)) Regulations 1995 and the Offshore Installations and Wells (Design, construction, etc) Regulations 1996. Workforce involvement: Again, another of Lord Cullen’s recommendations. The Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989 were amended by the Safety Case Regulations to place a duty on the operator to consult with the workforce in the preparation of safety cases and make available to them copies of the accepted safety case. The 2005 revision of the Safety Case Regulations now requires operators to summarise in their safety case how safety representatives for the installation were consulted with regard to the revision, review or preparation of the safety case. There are approximately 1,200 elected Safety Representatives that cover some 250 installations and 30,000 staff. The operator has a duty to ensure and pay for the training of the Safety Representatives. These Safety Representatives have made and continue to make a valuable contribution to safety offshore. Verification: The safety–critical parts of installations are verified as both initially suitable and also that they remain in good repair and condition by independent, competent bodies such as DNV or Lloyds. Permit to Work Systems: The permit to work system aims to ensure that proper planning and consideration is given to the risks of a particular job. It authorises certain people to do specific work at a certain time and place and sets out the main precautions needed to complete the work safely. Emergency Response and Evacuation: new regulations, training standards, guidelines and equipment have been introduced. Improved Incident Reporting: the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR), place a legal duty on employers to report work-related deaths, major injuries or over-three-day injuries, work related diseases, and dangerous occurrences (near miss incidents). Offshore releases of hydrocarbons are currently reported to the HSE as dangerous occurrences under RIDDOR, which became effective offshore on 1 April 1996. (Further information on RIDDOR can be found on: http://www.hse.gov.uk/riddor/) The Hydrocarbon Releases (HCR) System contains detailed voluntary information on offshore hydrocarbon release incidents supplementary to that provided under RIDDOR (and previous offshore legislation prior to April 1996) and the database contains reports dating from 1 October 1992. This web-based version of the HCR System, jointly funded by HSE and industry was launched in 2003. It allows duty holders and other authorised users access to the system to submit incident reports directly to HSE-OSD via on-line interactive forms. The HSE maintains an anonymous hotline for workers to call if they have any concerns about safety in their workplace. Step Change in Safety: founded in 1997 by the oil and gas industry trade associations with the aim of reducing the industry injury rate by 50 per cent, Step Change is a unique collaborative effort which has succeeded in uniting the sector at all levels on the essential issue of safety in the workplace. The projects undertaken by Step Change in Safety are led by a team of 24 high-ranking industry figures (increasing to 30 in 2008), including company managing directors, the HSE, Trade Unions and Trade Association representatives. Q: What does Step Change in Safety do to make offshore operations safer? A: The role of Step Change is to ensure that the lessons learnt and good practices developed are widely shared so that the overall Industry effort to improve safety performance is as effective as it possibly can be. Since its creation in 1997, Step Change has produced a number of products and launched a wide range of initiatives to improve safety awareness. These include good practice booklets (e.g. asset integrity toolkit or the task risk assessment guide) an interactive web site and safety alert database, the Vantage offshore passport system, videos and CDs covering issues as diverse as safety observational systems, lifting and mechanical handling etc. Step Change currently works through four work groups: Competence, Asset Integrity, Visible Leadership and Control of Work. The asset integrity workgroup was formed in 2007, replacing the Installation Integrity Working Group which was formed in 2004. The original group’s aim was to focus industry efforts not just on improving asset integrity but to develop a sustainable set of key performance indicators for the industry to adhere to. The group helped develop and collate a collection of good practice techniques and guidelines to assist operators to maintain and enhance asset integrity. It also produced a number of toolkits (essentially “How To” guides) on good practice as well as organising maintenance workshops and asset integrity seminars. The new asset integrity workgroup focuses mainly on leadership, education and learning in asset integrity management, more effective sharing of HSE and Industry good practices and the creation of improved leading indicators to measure asset integrity performance. The workgroup kicked off its innovative asset integrity programme with the creation of a unique sharing website. The first of its kind, the website improves communication within companies and across Industry on the key issues surrounding process safety and asset integrity, allowing companies to share good practice and boost their internal learning processes. The group has also created an asset integrity workshop for senior managers. This is intended to equip company leaders with enough knowledge to enable them to ask the right questions about asset integrity, and thus ensure that they are sufficiently well informed when setting priorities and making decisions. As well as providing a better collective understanding of asset integrity, the workshop will enable the team to collectively agree a plan of action to improve asset integrity management at all levels. The workshop is designed so that it can be run a number of times within an organisation so that the same messages are communicated at all management levels. Q: How much does the Industry invest in safety? A: Because safety is a fundamental part of offshore operations it is extremely difficult to isolate the expenditure which relates solely to safety. However, to give just one example, industry is investing heavily in asset integrity and has been doing so for a number of years, even before the recent large increase in oil price. Industry is currently spending more than £1 billion per year on integrity issues. Q: What is being done by the Industry to improve asset integrity and process safety? A: Industry works to ensure that asset integrity is a key area of focus, given the extended future that now lies in front of the UKCS. Dedicated asset integrity teams have been established in many companies to ensure the safety, reliability and efficiency of our offshore assets. Transparent reporting of safety performance and learning from accidents and incidents is encouraged through information sharing at several industry safety forums. The industry recognises the importance of joined-up working and engages the work force and trade unions through offshore safety committees and onshore networks. Q: What effects have the industry’s safety efforts had? A: The Safety Case Regulations that were introduced in 1992 have had a huge impact on the way safety is managed offshore. The HSE reviewed the effectiveness of the new Regulations in 1995 and concluded that the risk of fatalities would be reduced by 70% when all planned remedial measures were implemented. The Industry’s accident frequency rates have improved significantly since 1995, despite a 22% increase in the offshore workforce. Since 1997, when the Step Change initiative was launched, the industry’s safety record has shown significant improvement, with a 55% reduction in the total injury rate. Some companies have reported an even higher improvement during this time. The major injury rate alone has seen a 60% reduction since 1997, with the over 3-day injury rate also showing a 50% reduction. The industry’s safety record has also seen significant improvement in the number of dangerous occurrences occurring annually, with a 39% reduction in the dangerous occurrences rate (per million man hours) since 1997. In 2006, an Oil & Gas UK report reviewing the safety record of offshore helicopter operations found that whilst there have been a number of tragic helicopter accidents, the overall safety record is in fact a good one, when compared with other forms of UK land-based passenger transport. When comparing passenger fatality rates, offshore helicopter travel is eighteen times safer than riding a motorbike and of similar order to travelling by car. During the period 1995 – 2005, the UKCS reported one accident resulting in fatalities, whereas 63 fatal accidents were recorded world-wide. Q: How does safety in the oil and gas exploration and production industry compare with other industries? A: In terms of fatal accidents the oil industry is safer than construction, agriculture, manufacturing and the service industries. HSE statistics show that, in 1990 there were 13 fatal accidents in the oil industry. In 2006/07 there were 2 fatalities in the oil industry compared to 85 in the service sector and 77 in construction. Nevertheless one fatality is one too many, and the industry is striving to eliminate fatal accidents. Some people may argue that comparing the oil and gas industry with other industries is not appropriate as the oil and gas industry is a “major hazard industry” which has to manage incidents with potentially high consequences, but low probability of occurrence. However, all accidents are caused by the actions or inactions of people and therefore there is some merit in looking at accident statistics as a broad measure of the effectiveness of safety culture and management. Q: With Piper Alpha having happened 20 years ago, many younger people starting their offshore careers will not know about the lessons from Piper Alpha. How does industry ensure that the ‘Corporate memory’ is not lost? A: Oil & Gas UK has given a series of presentations to young industry trainees to pass on the important lessons learnt from the Piper Alpha disaster twenty years ago and ensure that the corporate memory is shared with the next generation of offshore workers. This included all the students, who were either in their first or second year of the Upstream Technician Training Scheme. They also learned the important role they each play not only in ensuring their own safety but that of their colleagues working alongside them and how the proper management of process safety is essential to prevent major accidents. Chris Allen, HSSE director with Oil & Gas UK said: “The majority of these young students were not even born at the time of the Piper Alpha disaster. Although the management of safety in the industry has improved enormously since then, the fundamental hazards remain. These technicians will eventually be responsible for the safe operation and maintenance of our offshore installations and need to appreciate the lessons from Piper and the importance of each of their individual contributions to safety.” These sessions for the young technicians were so successful that Oil & Gas UK organised another two presentations for young professionals in the industry and also produced a DVD including Chris Allen’s presentation. In his speech in a debate a the Scottish Parliament on 27 March 2008, Nigel Don (SNP, North East Scotland) praised the efforts undertaken by Oil & Gas UK: “I pay tribute to the industry body Oil & Gas UK, which recently arranged presentations to about 180 young technicians to repeat the lessons that were learned from the Piper Alpha disaster. The body understands the important point that corporate memory fades fast.” Q: What is being done to mark the anniversary? A: The 20th Anniversary of Piper Alpha will be marked by a Service of Remembrance at 2.00pm at the Kirk of St Nicholas, followed by an Act of Remembrance at the Piper Alpha Memorial, Hazlehead Park at 4.00pm. Both events are organised by the UK Oil & Gas Chaplaincy. There will be restrictions for photography and filming on the day, for further information please contact Britta Hallbauer on bhallbauer@oilandgasuk.co.uk or 01224 577331. Britta Hallbauer Oil & Gas UK Media Relations 3rd Floor, the Exchange 2 62 Market Street Aberdeen AB11 5PJ Tel: 01224 577331 Fax: 020 7802 2401 Email: bhallbauer@oilandgasuk.co.uk Mob: 07891769113 29/05/08